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Part of the Moving Stream:
State Constitutional Law,
Sodomy, and Beyond
BY SHIRLEY A. WIEGAND*
AND SARA FARR**
Over the course of several evenings in 1985, police officers in
Lexington, Kentucky, donned body microphones, assembled support
personnel, and set out to enforce the state's sodomy statute. They
frequented a popular downtown gathering place for gay men, where each
police officer engaged Ins targeted man m suggestive conversation. The
conversations lasted up to twenty-five minutes or until, encouraged by the
officer, the individual described the type of activity that would take place
if the other man accompanied him. At that point, the police officer
arrested the man on charges of solicitation to commit sodomy. One of the
men charged decided to challenge the state's sodomy law and, after seven
years of litigation,' prevailed when the Kentucky Supreme Court struck
down the sodomy statute as violating the Kentucky Constitution in
Commonwealth v. Wasson.2
An examination of this case demonstrates clearly the value of
increased reliance on state constitutional law when federal constitutional
* Associate Professor of Law, Umversity of Oklahoma. B.A. 1976, Urbana Umversity; .A.
1979, J.D. 1983, University of Kentucky.
Professor Wiegand served as co-counsel for Jeffrey Wasson in his hearing before the Fayette
District Court and the Fayette Circuit Court. Several Lexington, Kentucky, attorneys also cooperated
in Mr. Wasson's defense, including Dean W. Bucalos, Pam Goldman, Ernesto Scorsone, and
Professor Carolyn Bratt of the University of Kentucky College of Law. The trial preparation,
research, and bnef-writing were a collective effort.
** J.D. candidate 1993, University of Oklahoma.
The case took seven years for several reasons. First, the trial court delayed the trial until after
the U.S. Supreme Court had decided the constitutionality of Georgia's sodomy statute in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Then, after the Kentucky statute was declared unconstitutional atthe
trial court level, Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 86-M-859 (Fayette Dist Ct. Oct 3, 1986), the
Commonwealth appealed to the circuit court. Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 86-X-48 (Fayette Cir.
Ct. Oct. 13, 1987). That court dismissed the appeal on procedural grounds; the Commonwealth
appealed, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the circuit court for
consideration of the case on its merits. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 785 S.W.2d 67 (Ky. Ct. App.
1990). After the circuit court ruled in favor of the defendant on the merits, Commonwealth v.
Wasson, No. 86-X-48 (Fayette Cir. Ct. June 8, 1990), the Kentucky Supreme Court granted transfer
of the case, bypassing further consideration by the court of appeals. Oral arguments were held in the
spring of 1992 and the opinion was handed down in September, 1992. Commonwealth v. Wasson,
842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
1 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
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law fails. This Article focuses primarily on the Kentucky sodomy case,
but it also examines recent cases in other jurisdictions in which state
constitutions have been employed in novel ways. The Kentucky case is
not an aberration; rather it is part of a "moving stream."3 The utilization
of state constitutional law in areas that historically have relied upon the
U.S. Constitution should encourage an increased examination of state
constitutions. In some areas, these state charters represent the frontier of
undiscovered legal terrain.
I. INTRODUCTION TO STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A revolution is taking place among those who seek social change through
litigation. Rather than continuing to look to the U.S. Constitution for
protection of established rights, as well as the expansion of these rights,
lawyers are searching their state constitutions for such protection and
expansion. Although some commentators claim that judges who rely upon
state constitutions are engaging in the "invention!' of new rights,4 their fears
are unfounded. State constitutions are often used because they specifically
enumerate rights that the U.S. Constitution grants only by implication, if it
provides for them at all.' Therefore, commentators who fault state judges for
recognizing greater protection than that guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution
should devote their energies to the pursuit of legislative change, rather than
making naked assertions of the perceived dangers ofjudicil activism.
Tis section does not focus on the use of any particular state's constitu-
tion, but instead explores the benefits that can be derived from the use of state
constitutions generally. It is first helpful to analyze the relationship between
state constitutions and the U.S. Constitution. While the U.S. Constitution has
' The Wasson court notes: "Thus our decision, rather than being the leading edge of change,
is but a part of the moving stream." Id. at 498.
' See Steven J. Twist & Len L. Munsil, The Double Threat ofJudtaal Activism: Inventing New
"Rights" in State Constitutions, 21 ARm. ST. L.J. 1005 (1989).
' For example, the U.S. Constitution prohibits Congress from making any "law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof "U.S. CONsr. amend. I. The
Kentucky Constitution, on the other hand, provides that all citizens have the "right ofworshipping
Almighty God according to the dictates of their consciences." KY. CONsr. § 1. The Kentucky
Constitution further provides:
No preference shall ever be given by law to any religious sect, society or denormnation;
nor to any particular creed, mode of worship or system of ecclesiastical polity, nor shall
any person be compelled to attend any place of worship, to contribute to the erection or
maintenance of any such place, or to the salary or support of any minister of religion; nor
shall any man be compelled to send his child to any school to which he may be
conscientiously opposed; and the civil rights of no person shall be taken away, or in
anywise dimimshed or enlarged, on account of Ins belief or disbelief of any religious
tenet, dogma or teaching. No human authority shall, in any case whatever, control or
interfere with the rights of conscience.
Ky. CONST. § 5.
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long been viewed as the most successful weapon in many battles waged
to protect individual rights, it is important to remember that many state
constitutions predate the Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the incorporation doctrine.' Additionally, many state constitutions are
copied from other states' constitutions, rather than from the federal
model.'
The only limitation that the U.S. Constitution places on the rights
granted by state constitutions is that a state constitution cannot afford less
protection than is guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.8 In the more
typical situation, a state court judge, faced with interpreting his or her
state constitution, either marches m lockstep with federal constitutional
interpretation or interprets the state constitution as providing greater rights
than the U.S. Constitution.9 Although the U.S. Constitution limits the
powers of the federal government to a specifically delegated list,
reserving all other powers to the states,"0 states are not as limited by
federalism concerns. Therefore, state constitutions are often longer, more
detailed, and deal with a much broader range of subjects than the U.S.
Constitution."
The use of state constitutions to protect individual liberties is
recognized and encouraged by some federal judges. Justice Brennan noted
in 1977 that "[s]tate constitutions are a font of individual liberties,
their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme
Court's interpretation of federal law."'2 Even if litigants are not encour-
aged to look to their state constitutions for protection, they are often
'See Phylis Skloot Bamberger, Boosting Your Case ith Your State Consto, A.B.A. J.,
Mar. 1, 1986, at 49.
7 Id.
' See John C. Cooper, Beyond the Federal Constitution: The Status ofState Constitutional Law
in Flonda, 18 STErsoN L. REV. 241, 244 (1989).
' See, eg., Pneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (affirming the
authority of states to provide for more expansive individual rights in their constitutions than those
conferred by the U.S. Constitution).
10 U.S. CoNsr. amend. X
"Ten state constitutions, for example, contain an express constitutional privacy right. See
ALASKA CoNsr. art. I, § 22; AMz. CoNsr. art. I, § 8; CAL. CoNsr. art. I, § I ("All people have
inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquing, possessing,
and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaiing safety, happiness, and privacy."); FLA. CONSr.
art. I, § 23 ("Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental Mtrusion
into his private life except as otherwise provided herein."); HAw. CoNsr. art. I, §§ 6-7; ILL CONST.
art. I, § 6; LA. CoNsr. art. I, § 5 ('Every person shall be secure in Is person, property, commumca-
tions, houses, papers, and effects against . invasions of privacy.); MoNT. CONSr. art. II, § 10; S.C.
CoNsr. art. I, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. For other examples of state constitutions that expressly
grant more expansive rights or deal with a wider range of subjects than the U.S. Constitution,
particularly in the areas of equal protection, religion, free speech and access to the courts, see
JEIF FRmsEN, STATE CoNsrrnoNAL LAw: LITIGATING INDMVUAL RIGHTS, ClAimS AND
DEFssn S app. 3A, 4A, SA, 6A (1992).
" William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HAltv.
L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
WASSON
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forced by necessity to do so when they learn that the federal courts will
not provide them with the constitutional protection they seek. This was
the situation m which those challenging sodomy laws found themselves
after Bowers v. Hardwick,3 m which the U.S. Supreme Court refused
to extend the federal right of privacy to gay persons"' engaging in acts
of sodomy.
While some portions of state constitutions are identical to the U.S.
Constitution, other parts of state constitutions vary enough from the U.S.
Constitution so as to provide greater rights. Some of these differences may
appear slight indeed, yet produce vastly different results for litigants. For
example, the Michigan Supreme Court held in Michigan v. Bullock"5 that
a state statute 6 providing a mandatory punishment of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole for possession of over 650 grams of cocaine
violated the Michigan Constitution's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. 7 While the Michigan Constitution prohibition is nearly
identical to that of the U.S. Constitution, the two have textual variations that
lead to opposite results in determining the constitutionality of the same statute
under state and federal law.' Even when the wording of a state constitution
repeats that of the federal document, states may interpret their constitutions
unfettered by federal jurisprudence. 9
" 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
' We use the words "gay persons! or "gays" or lesbians" to refer to those persons who identify
themselves by their sexual orientation. We use the word "homosexual" to refer to sexual acts between
persons of the same gender, regardless of whether the persons engaging in the acts identify
themselves as gay. Many legal opinions do not make tis distinction, regularly referring to gays as
homosexuals. See Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexulity, and Political Values: Searching for
the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE LJ. 1073 (1988), for further discussion
of this issue.
Furthermore, we use the term "sexual orientation" rather than "sexual preference." Although
much debate surrounds this nomenclature, the expert witnesses in Commonwealth v. Wasson testified
that gay persons do not choose intimate partners on the basis of personal preference; choice plays
very little, if any, role in such decisions. One's orientation toward a same-sex partner is instead
something over which one has as little control as another has over his or her orientation toward a
partner of the opposite gender.
" 485 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1992).
MIcH. COMP. LAws § 333.7403(2XaX1) (1988).
MICH. CoNsr. art. 1, § 16.
Compare U.S. CONSr. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual pumshments inflicted.') (emphalis added) with MIcH. CONsr. art.
I, § 16 ('Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines shall not be iniposed; cruel or unusual
punishment shall not be inflicted, nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detaned.") (emphasis added).
Under the federal provision, Michlgan's statute was found constitutional. Harmelin v. Michigan, III
S. CL 2680 (1991). However, the same statute was found to violate the Michigan Constitution.
Michigan v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1992). Essentially, the U.S. Supreme Court, per Scalia,
would require a punishment to be both cruel and unusual before finding an Eighth Amendment
violation. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2691. Miclugan forbids either type of punishment. Bullock 485
N.W.2d at 872.
" See Brennan, supra note 12, at 491.
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Although the use of state constitutions is gaining acceptance
among the judiciary, lawyers may be slow to accept the challenge. In
their effort to provide a broad legal education, law schools rarely
focus on the laws of the state in which they are located, much less on
that state's constitution. Perhaps as a result, it is difficult for many
attorneys to suddenly shift focus from the U.S. Constitution, with
which they are familiar, to a state constitution, with which they may
have had little experience. Likewise, state courts are often hesitant to
base decisions on state constitutional grounds, perhaps because they
are unfamiliar with their constitution or because so little state
constitutional jurisprudence has been created." They are, in effect,
being asked to plow new ground.
While attorneys and the judiciary are beginning to familiarize
themselves with state constitutional law, others are not as comfortable
with its use. In both California and Florida, movements to restrain an
"activist" judiciary resulted in the amendment of the state constitu-
tions to prevent state courts from interpreting their constitution in
such a way as to give litigants protections greater than those found in
the U.S. Constitution.2' Although California's action was later
As one scholar notes: "Even though a large number of states have equal protection clauses
and equal rights provisions in their constitutions, few courts in states that maintain sodomy statutes
have developed an equal protection jurisprudence distinct from federal law." Aili A. Morrs,
Challenging Sodomy Statutes: State Costutional Protections for Sexual Privacy, 66 IND. LJ. 609,
621 (1991).
2 The Califorma Constitution was amended to provide:
In crimnal cases the rights of a defendant to equal protection of the laws, to due process
of law, to the assistance of counsel, to be personally present with counsel, to a speedy and
public trial, to compel the attendance of witnesses, to confront the witnesses against him
or her, to be free from unreasonable searches and seires, to privacy, to not be compelled
to be a witness against himself or herself, to not be placed twice in jeopardy for the same
offense, and to not suffer the imposition of cruel and unusual pumshment, shall be
construed by the courts of this state in a manmer consistent with the Constitution of the
United States. Ths Constituto shall not be construed by the courts to afford greater
nghts to cnmnal defendants than those afforded by the Constitution of the United Sates,
nor shall it be construed to afford greater nghts to mnnors in juvenile proceedings on
criunal cases than those afforded by the Constitution of the United States.
CAr. CONSr. art. I, § 24 (as amended by Proposition 115 in 1990) (emphasis added). Tins
amendment was found unconstitutional in Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990). See
infra note 22.
The Flonda Constitution, as amended in 1982, provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and semires. and against the unreasonable interception of private
communications by any means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued except
upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place or places to
be intercepted, and the nature of the evidence to be obtained. This right shall be
construed in conformity with the 4th amendment to the United States Constitution, as
iterpreted by the United States Supreme Court Articles or information obtained in
violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence iJfsuch articles or information
would be inadmssible under the decsons of the United States Supreme Court constriamg
the 4th amendment to the United States Constitution.
FLA. Co Nsr. art. I, § 12 (emphasis added).
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declared invalid, the Florida amendment remains in place. Such constitu-
tional tinkering demonstrates the concern over increasing reliance upon the
heretofore undiscovered power of state constitutional law. The actions taken
in Florida and California represent attempts to stem the current that flows
more and more toward state constitutional jurisprudence.
Tactically, several points must be considered when raising a state
constitutional claim. First, presentation of the state claim should be made at
every step in the litigation and should be distinct from any federal claim?
Second, cases should be cited that show how the interpretation of state
constitutional law developed2 Third, because a litigant will be attempting
to persuade a state court that the state constitution provides more expansive
rights than does the U.S. Constitution, it is important for litigants to avoid
citing federal case law to support their interpretation of state law?' If a
decision is not clearly based on a state court's interpretation of state law or the
state constitution, the decision could be subject to federal review 6 Clearly,
this is not the desired result.
The use of state constitutional law has met with success in numerous
cases. Following are just a few examples.
In South Dakota v. Opperman,27 the South Dakota Supreme Court held
that the inventory search of a car that was towed for illegal parking violated
the South Dakota Constitution. This decision clearly contradicted the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision that the search of Opperman's car was reasonable
and did not violate the U.S. Constitution.28 The South Dakota court even
recognized that while the provision of the South Dakota Constitution that had
been violated was almost identical to the Fourth Amendment, which the U.S.
Supreme Court held had not been violated, the Supreme Court of South
Dakota was the proper court to determine interpretation of its state constitu-
tion.29
A recent New York Court of Appeals decision demonstrates that court's
willingness to apply its state constitution so as to grant criminal
' The California Supreme Court held that the amendment to Califorma Constitution article I,
§ 24, was an invalid revision of the constitution because it unduly restricted judicial power and did
so in a way that severely limited the independent force and effect of the constitution. Raven v.
Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1087-89 (Cal. 1990).
" Bamberger, supra note 6, at 50.
'4 Id.
2 Id.
'Id.
'7 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976).
"South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1975).
South Dakota v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d at 674-75. See also New Hampshwe v. Hogg, 385
A.2d 844 (N.H. 1978) (holding that although the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted Double
Jeopardy Clause of U.S. Constitution as not barring dual state and federal prosecutions based upon
the same conduct, state Double Jeopardy Clause precluded prosecution of defendants for bank
robbery following acquittal in federal court on charges of robbing the same federally insured bank).
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defendants more rights than are granted by the U.S. Constitution. In New
York v. Scott,' the court declined to adopt the U.S. Supreme Court's
categorical ruling in Oliver v. United States31 that the Fourth Amend-
ment protects people only in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
and not in places outside their curtilage. 2 The Scott court found that the
Oliver majority's literal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment was of
little relevance to the Scott court's interpretation of the New York
Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.3
The New York constitutional provision, which differs textually from the
Fourth Amendment,' had a history and jurisprudence quite distinct from
those of the Fourth Amendment.' The Scott court was thus able to
conclude that a landowner who fences private property or posts "no
trespassing' signs has a reasonable expectation of privacy and thus law
enforcement officers may not lawfiilly invade without a warrant.'
The same New York Court of Appeals held in New York v.
Keta37 that a New York statute authorizing warrantless administrative
searches of vehicle-dismantling businesses ("chop shops") violated the
state constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The Keta court thus refused to apply the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in New York v. Burger," where the Court found that the
same statute did not violate the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. The Keta court noted: "While State and Federal
uniformity is a worthwhile goal in constitutional decision-making, that
goal 'must yield to [the need for] a predictable, structured
analysis,' lest rules governing official intrusions on individuals'
privacy become muddied and the guarantees of Article 1, Section 12
diluted."'39 The concumng opinion suggested: "Dual sovereignty has
in fact proved itself not a weakness but a strength of our system of
government. States, for example, by recognizing greater constitutional
safeguards as a matter of State law, can serve as 'laboratories' for
national law "40
593 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992).
31 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
n Id. at 177.
3&ott, 593 N.E.2d at 1338 (interpreting N.Y. CoNsr. art. I, § 12).
The New York vernon adds a clause providing protection against interception of telephone
and telegraph communications. N.Y. CoNsr. art I, § 12.
&ot, 593 N.E.2d at 1336-38.
"Id. at 1338.
"593 N.E.2d 1328, 1339 (N.Y. 1992). Although New York v. Keta was consolidated with Scott
on appeal and thus should also properly be referred to as New York v. Sco, it is addressed separately
in this Article, as it is in the consolidated case.
482 U.S. 691 (1987).
,Keta, 593 N.E.2d at 1342 (quoting People v. Johnson, 488 N.E.2d 439 (1985)).
,Id. at 1348 (Kaye, J., concurring) (alluding to the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in
W"~soN
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In light of these and numerous other examples m which litigants have
benefited from using state constitutions, the use of these sources of law
should be considered by lawyers when preparing to try a case, as well as
by law professors when teaching their students about the "law," here-
tofore usually federal constitutional law, and by law students as they
prepare to become lawyers, law professors, judges, and legislators. An
examination of the recent Kentucky sodomy case demonstrates the
effective use of state constitutional law.
HI. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v WASSON
A. Setting the Stage
The crmunal prosecution of Jeffrey Wasson began some months
before the momentous decision m Bowers v. Hardwicci" m which the
U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the Georgia sodomy
statute.'2 In fact, anticipating that the Bowers case would be resolved m
a manner favorable to Wasson, his attorneys asked the district court to
delay proceedings until after the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled. When the
Court held instead that the U.S. Constitution does not guarantee a
"fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual
sodomy," 43 the defense attorneys were forced to reexamine the strength
of their challenge to Kentucky's sodomy statute. They found the necessary
strength not m the U.S. Constitution, but in their state constitution.
Jeffrey Wasson was prosecuted for solicitation to commit sodomy in
violation of the state's sodomy statute, Kentucky Revised Statutes section
510.100: "A person is guilty of sodomy in the fourth degree when he
engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person of the same
sex."4 Deviate sexual intercourse means "any act of sexual gratification
between persons not married to each other involving the sex organs of
one person and the mouth or anus of another." 
4
The Fayette County District Court" held a hearing on the constitu-
tionality of the statute at which seven experts testified for the defen-
dant 7 A cultural anthropologist demonstrated that gay persons have
New York Ice Co. v. Liebinann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)).
" 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
42 Id. at 192.
43 Id.
"Ky. R v. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990).
,Id. § 510.010.
"District courts in Kentucky hear civil cases with values under $4,000.00, probate matters, and
criminal nusderneanor and violation cases. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 24A.110, .120 (Miclue/Bobbs-
Merrill 1992).
41 These experts were: Dr. Susan Abbot, cultural anthropologist at the University of Kentucky;,
Dr. Nancy Dye, social histonan at the University of Kentucky; the Rev. George Edwards,
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existed in many cultures and have been treated in a variety of ways by
those cultures, ranging from intolerance to tolerance to legitimation as an
integral segment of the culture's society. A theologian testified about
various interpretations of Biblical passages concerning sodomy and stated
that he, along with many other theologians, now believe that sodomy as
defined in criminal statutes was not the act condemned in the Bible. For
example, he stated that the evils condemned in the well-known Sodom
and Gomorrah story are those of inhospitality and aggression against
strangers. 48
Three other witnesses-a social historian, a psychologist, and a
therapist-also testified about society's treatment of homosexuality. Dr.
Martin Weinberg, a well-known and widely published sociologist and sex
researcher, and coauthor of the Kinsey Report on Homosexuals, testified
about his work with gay persons and demonstrated that many widely held
beliefs about gays have no basis m fact.49 Finally, although the topic of
AIDS was fairly new when the hearing was held in 1986, an expert in
infectious diseases testified about the criminal statute's effect on
transmission of the disease.' He testified that cnmmalizmg anal sex
between gays interfered with the fight against AIDS by discouraging gays
from presenting accurate medical histories out of fear of prosecution."
Although the defense attorneys advised the Fayette County Attorney's
Office of the defendant's intention to offer expert testimony at the
hearing, no evidence was presented for the Commonwealth.52
Presbyterian numster and Professor Emeritus of the New Testament at the Presbyterian Theological
Seminary in Louisville, Kentucky;, Mr. Edwin Hackne, therapist at Comprehensive Care in
Lexington, Kentucky;, Dr. Martin . Raf, Professor of Medicine at the Umversity of Lousville and
Chief of the Section of Infectious Diseases; Dr. Rory Remer, psychologist in Lexington, Kentucky;
and Dr. Martin Weinberg, sociologist and sex researcher, Indiana Umiversity. See Commonwealth v.
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 490 n.i (Ky. 1992).
" Brief for Appellee at 2, Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992). According to the story of
Sodom and Gomorrah, after Lot had given shelter to two angels dressed as men, the townsmen came
to his home and asked Lot to "[b]nng them out to us that we may have intimacies with them"
Instead, Lot replied, "I beg you my brothers, not to do this wicked thing. I have two daughters who
have never had intercourse with men. Let me bring them out to you, and you may do to them as you
please. But don't do anything to these men, for you know they have come under the shelter of my
roof." Genesis 19:5-8 (New Am. Bible for Catholics).
" Weinberg testified that homosexuality is not a choice or"preference," homosexual role models
do not produce homosexuals, having a domnant mother or weak father does not "create" a gay
person, gays are just as likely as heterosexuals to have a stable and loving relationship with another,
that both gays and heterosexuals prefer monogamy, and that repeal of sodomy laws does not increase
the incidence of homosexuality. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 489.
Id. at 489-90.
"Id. at 490.
"At the end of the hearing, the County Attorney attempted to introduce into evidence some
books he had brought with hum. However, he failed to lay any foundation at all for the introduction
afid the court ruled the books inadmissible. It is difficult to determine why the prosecution made no
attempt to offer any evidence, but that failure certainly may have played a role in the decision of the
Kentucky Supreme Court to overturn the sodomy statute. See Id. ("The Commonwealth .presented
W/.MON
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The Fayette County District Court ruled that the state's sodomy
statute violated the defendant's right to privacy as protected under the
Kentucky Constitution.3 This decision was affirmed by the Fayette
County Circuit Court, which also found that the statute violated the state's
equal protection guarantee. ' A third ground, violation of state and
federal protections against cruel and unusual punishment, was not
successful at the district court level,55 and neither the circuit court nor
the supreme court directly addressed it.' The circuit court stated
unequivocally that the sodomy statute was "being held unconstitutional
not under the U.S. Constitution, but under our State Constitution."57 The
court also cautioned: "In the past, the courts and attorneys in Kentucky
may have neglected our State Constitution and have forgotten the
importance of that document in assuring Kentuckians certain inherent and
inalienable rights. To maintain these rights requires a constant vigil by
Kentucky citizens, attorneys and Courts."'M
As noted by the circuit court, neglect of state constitutions is manifest
in arguments and briefs. But the litigants in Wasson quickly discovered
that state constitutions often yield a rich history of individualism or populism
and invite interpretations that vary from those of the federal document. Such
is the case in Kentucky, particularly in the area of privacy rights.
B. State Right to Pnvacy
Alcohol and tobacco use--two controversial subjects in Kentucky
history-provided an abundant source of right to privacy jurisprudence in the
litigation of Commonwealth v. Wasson. Sections 1 and 2 of the state
constitution served as the fiamework:
no witnesses and offers no scientific evidence or social science data.").
Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 86-M-859 (Fayette Dist. Ct. Oct. 3, 1986).
Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 86-X-48 (Fayette Cir. Ct. June 8, 1990).
Wasson, No. 86-M-859, at 2.
"In fact, this argument might meet with more success in other states. Unlike Kentucky, where
a sodomy conviction could result in a jail sentence of no more than one year, other states penalize
sodomy with significantly longer sentences. In Oklahoma, for example, sodomy may result m a ten-
year prison sentence, while in Georgia, the maximum is twenty years. See GA. CODE AMN. § 16-6-2
(Michie 1992); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.100, 532.090 (Michxe/Bobbs-Menrill 1990); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 21, § 886 (1991).
Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that the sodomy statute is unconstitutional
when applied to consenting heterosexual adults, Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. 1986), the court
refused to address the question of homosexuality in that case. Id. at 1109-10. In Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986), the Court did not consider an Eighth Amendment challenge, but Justice Powell
noted that had the defendant raised such a challenge, a long sentence "would create a serious Eighth
Amendment issue." Id. at 197 (Powell, J., concurring). Of course, Harmelin v. Michigan, 11I S.Ct.
2680 (1991), discussed supm note 18, presents a major obstacle to any Eighth Amendment challenge.
W asson, No. 86-X-48, at 14.
"Id. at 14-15.
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Section 1: All men are, by nature, free and equal and have certain
inherent and unalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the
right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties [and]
the right of seeking and pursuing their safety and happiness.
Section 2: Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and
property of freemen exists nowhere m a republic, not even in the largest
majority.'
Tobacco and alcohol cases gave these sections substance.
Commonwealth v. Campbell,'° a case involving the consumption of
alcohol in private, was the cornerstone of the defendant's argument m
Wasson and was accepted as such by the Kentucky Supreme Court." In
this 1909 case, the state's highest court relied on Kentucky's 1891
constitution to find a right of privacy protecting such conduct Comment-
mg on a citizen's possession of alcoholic beverages for his own use, the
Campbell court stated:
[I]t never has been within the competency of the Legislature to so
restrct the liberty of the citizen, and certainly not since the adoption of
the present Constitution. The Bill of Rights would be but an empty
sound if the Legislature could prohibit the citizen the right of owning
or drinking liquor, when in so doing he did not offend the laws of
decency by being intoxicated in public. Man in his natural state has a
nght to do whatever he chooses and has the power to do. When he
becomes a member of organized society, under governmental regulation,
he surrenders, of necessity, all of his natural right the exercise of which
is, or may be, injurious to ls fellow citizens. This is the price that he
pays for governmental protection, but it is not within the competency of
a free government to invade the sanctity of the absolute rights of the
citizen any further than the direct protection of society requres.62
Like the Campbell court, Wasson's attorneys, and later the
Kentucky Supreme Court, looked to the writings of Blackstone and
John Stuart Mill for support. The Campbell court had quoted
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England: "Let a man
therefore be ever so abandoned in his principles, or vicious in his
practice, provided he keeps his wickedness to himself, and does not
offend against the rules of public decency, he is out of the reach of
human laws."'63 John Stuart Mill warranted even greater attention by
'Ky. CoNsr. §§ 1, 2.
117 S.W. 383 (Ky. 1909).
"See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 494 (Ky. 1992).
Campbell, 117 S.W. at 385.
,Id. at 386 (quoting 1 WmLiAM BLAcKsroNF, CommNmrAllms *124 (1890)).
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the Campbell court, which quoted at length from what it referred to
as his "great work," On Liberty
"The only part of the conduct of any one, for winch he is amenable
to society, is that which concerns others. In the part winch merely
concerns imself, his independence is, of right, absolute .[T]he
principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan
of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to
such consequences as may follow; without impediment from our
fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even
though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or
wrong.""
In holding that the right to use alcohol is a "natural and inalien-
able" right, the Campbell court stated:
The theory of our government is to allow the largest liberty to the
individual commensurate with the public safety, or as it has been
otherwise expressed, that government is best winch governs the
least. Under our institutions there is no room for that inquisitorial
and protective spirit winch seeks to regulate the conduct of men in
matters in themselves indifferent and to make them conform to a
standard not of their own choosing, but the choosing of the lawgiver
65
Other Kentucky cases relied on by the defendant and the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court also embraced the Millsian underpinnings of
state constitutional interpretation. In Commonwealth v. Smith," the
court held unconstitutional a statute that mandated that liquor could
be stored only in one's private residence. Smith was arrested for
drinking beer in the back room of an office. The court stated:
The power of the state to regulate and control the conduct of a
private individual is confined to those cases where his conduct
injuriously affects others. With ins faults or weaknesses, winch he
keeps to himself, and which do not operate to the detriment of
others, the state as such has no concern.'
Protection of private drinking practices continued to warrant the
attention of Kentucky's highest court after Smith. In Lewis v. Common-
" JOHN STuART ML., ON LUBmTY 22-23, 28 (Umv. Mich. 1978), earlier editon cited m
Campbell, 117 S.W. at 386.
Campbell, 117 S.W. at 387.
" 173 S.W. 340 (Ky. 1915).
"Id. at 343.
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wealth, the court held that drinking m a private hotel room does not
constitute public mtoxication,"9 while in Commonwealth v. Vincent,"
the court protected the act of becoming drunk in a private dwelling. '
The vice of tobacco smoking had also generated controversy in the
state's highest court, with resolution in favor of state constitutional
privacy rights. In Hershberg v. City of Barbourville,' the court, citing
Campbell, struck down an ordinance that prohibited smoking m private
residences: "To prohibit the smoking of cigarettes in the citizen's own
home is an invasion of his right to control his own personal indul-
gences .9' The ordinance "umreasonably interfere[s] with the right
of the citizen to determine for himself such personal matters." 4
These earlier cases presaged the emergence of the recognized right to
privacy m Kentucky. Although it is unclear when, or if, a federal
constitutional right to privacy emerged, it first received widespread
attention m 1890 in a Harvard Law Review article entitled The Right to
Privacy, written by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis." Thirty-
eight years later, as a U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Brandeis wrote a
dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States76 m wich he defined
the right to privacy as "the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." But it was not
until the 1960s that the privacy right was recognized by a majority of the
Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut.'
In contrast, in the state of Kentucky, the privacy rights of citizens
were respected by the courts as early as 1909. In that year, not only was
Campbell decided, but the state's highest court also recognized invasion
of privacy as a tort m Foster-Milburn Company v. Chlnn.79 In 1927, the
- 247 S.W. 749 (Ky. 1923).
" Id. at 751.
137 S.W.2d 1091 (Ky. 1940).
Id. at 1092.
133 S.W. 985 (Ky. 1911).
"Id. at 986.
"Id.
Samuel D. Warren & Lows D. Brandeis The Right to Privacy, 4 HAky. L. Rv. 193 (1890).
n 277 U.S. 438 (1928), om-ded by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
" Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
n 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Of course, "privacy" rights involve many differing interests, ranging
from "informational" or "access" privacy rights, which have been recognized for many decades, to
the more recent type of privacy interest-the right to live one's personal life free of governmental
interference. See Kevin W. Saunders, Prvacy and Social Contract: A Defense of Judial Activism
i Privacy Cases, 33 ARiz. L. REv. 811, 814-16 (1991) (noting that courts have on occasion confused
the two).
7 120 S.W. 364 (Ky. 1909). Both Commonwealth v. Campbell and Faster-Milburn Company
v. Chum involved what is generally referred to as the right of privacy. But Campbell involved the
right to live one's personal life free of governmental interference, whereas Foster-Mlburn involved
informational privacy. In Foster-Milburn, the court held that publishing a photograph of an individual
without his consent violates hIs right to privacy. 120 S.W. at 366. See supra note 78.
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court defined the right to privacy as "the right to be left alone, that is, the
right of a person to be free from unwarranted publicity, or the right to live
without unwarranted interference by the public about matters with which the
public is not necessarily concerned."' This rich history of state privacy
rights provides fertile ground for privacy claims that might fail under the U.S.
Constitution. In Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Wasson, it gave the Kentucky
Supreme Court a basis for its decision.
C State Equal Protection
In addition to the state nght'of privacy, state equal protection analysis
served as another basis for the Kentucky Supreme Court's Wasson decision.
Under the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution,8' courts must examine certain classifications of
persons by governmental actors to determine whether the classification at
issue serves a sufficiently legitimate purpose. The level of scrutiny applied to
any challenged classification vanes with the parameters of the classified
group.
If a group is classified by race, nationality, or alienage, the group is a
"suspect class," and the law creating this class will be examined at the highest
level, "strict scrutiny." Determining whether a group is a suspect class
involves the analysis of several factors: whether the group has suffered a
history of purposeful discrimination, whether the discrimination has been
invidious, and whether the group lacks the political power to seek redress
from the political branches of government. Invidiousness is generally defined
by considering several additional questions: whether the trait that defines the
class bears any relation to ability to perform or contribute to society, whether
the class has suffered unique disabilities because of maccurate stereotypes,
and whether the trait that defines the class is rmmutable s3 Any suspect
classification must be necessary, or narrowly tailored, to serve a "compelling"
state interest. The same elevated scrutiny is applied when the classification
impinges on 'personal rights protected by the Constitution,' l.e., fundamental
nghts.84
If a group is classified by gender or by the status of illegitimacy, the
group is a "quasi-suspect" class, and the law creating the classification will
be examined with a heightened degree of scrutiny, although not as rigorously
' Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967, 969-70 (Ky. 1927).
Ile Fifth Amendment is implicated when the federal government's action is alleged to be
unconstitutionally discriminatory, the Fourteenth Amendment when the actor is state government.
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
See, g., Watlans v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 724-27 (9th Cir. 1989) (Noms, J,
concurring); see also CGebume, 473 U.S. at 440-42 (discussing legislative classifications based on
gender, illegitimacy, age, and mental retardation).
" See C/ebume, 473 U.S. at 440.
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as if the group were "suspect." The standard for discrimination against
such a group is that the classification must be substantially related to an
important state interest85
Other group classifications warrant only the lowest level of scruti-
ny-"'rational basis" review-and will be presumed valid and will be
sustained if the classification is rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest." Particularly when social or economic legislation
is the basis of the classification, the states are allowed substantial latitude
in their classification scheme.8
Classifications based on sexual orientation have been challenged m
a number of cases, often in the context of the military's treatment of gay
soldiers. Although Bowers v. Hardwick5' involved neither the Equal
Protection Clause nor any analogous state constitutional provision, 9
many courts have relied upon that case to reject federal equal protection
challenges to statutes that discriminate against gays. For example, in High
Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a Fifth Amendment equal protection
challenge to the Department of Defense's policy of denying high-security
clearances to gay applicants. The court noted that Hardwick stood for the
proposition that "homosexual activity is not a fundamental right protected
by substantive due process and that the proper standard of review under
the Fifth Amendment is rational basis review."' Furthermore, the court
noted that "it would be incongruous to expand the reach of equal
protection to find a fundamental right of homosexual conduct under the
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment."' The court reasoned that "because homosexual conduct
can thus be crinnalized, homosexuals cannot constitute a suspect or
quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis review for equal
protection purposes."93 Several other circuits have reached similar
conclusions, citing Hardwick.9'
See id. at 440-41.
" See id. at 440.
"See id.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
"The opinion states in a footnote that the defendant did not raise equal protection as a basis
for Ins argument, Id. at 196 n.8, perhaps because the Georgia sodomy statute penalizes the acts of
both homosexuals and heterosexuals. However, in his dissent Justice Blackmun suggests that a claim
of discriminatory enforcement of the law might be made under the Equal Protection Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. Id. at 202 n.2 (Blacknun, J., dissenting).
"895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
" Id. at 571.
"Id.
"Id.
"See Bea-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989); Woodward v. United States, 871
F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel rejected these arguments m
Watans v. United States Army, holding that gays constitute a suspect class
subject to strict scrutiny. However, the court sitting en banc subsequently
withdrew the opinion and ruled in favor of the soldier on estoppel grounds,
finding it unnecessary to reach the constitutional issues."
A significant distinction between Hardwick and the military cases is that
the statute m Hardwck prohibited sodomous actse whether engaged m by
heterosexuals or homosexuals.97 In contrast, the military explicitly classifies
gay men and lesbians as a separate class, "8 as does the sodomy statute m
Kentucky, which penalizes sodomous acts only when performed by members
of the same gender." This distinction was not persuasive in the cases
discussed above."o Federal equal protection arguments have not met with
success in cases involving gay persons, and m recent years, federal courts
generally have not been willing to extend equal protection coverage to any
other groups.
°10
Commonwealth v. Wasson'" demonstrates that state equal protection
arguments may fill the gap left by restrictive applications of federal law. The
source of equal protection m Kentucky is found in sections 2 and 3 of its
state constitution:
Section 2: Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property
of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority.
Section 3: All men, when they form a social compact, are equal 103
11 Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988) (2-1 decision), withdrawn, 875
F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banoc). In the earlier decision, the appellate panel explained that Bowers
v. Hardwik did not apply to this case because Hardwick dealt with homosexual acts, whereas tins
case dealt with sexual orientation. Furthermore, concerning Hardwck the panel stated- "The parties
did not argue and the Court explicitly did not decide the question whether the Georgia sodomy state
might violate the equal protection clause." 847 F.2d at 1339-40. "[Nlotbing in Hardwick actually
holds that the state may make invidious distinctions when regulating sexual conduct," id. at 1340,
and "substantive due process and specifically the right to privacy have little relevance to equal
protection doctrine" Id. at 1341.
"The sodomous acts prohibited in the Georgia statute are oral and anal mtercourse. Hardwtck
478 U.S. at 188 n.l.
' Id. at 188.
"In fact, when a self-identified heterosexual engages in an isolated homosexual act, the military
is willing to forgive and forget. It will not, however, be so forgiving to one who identifies himself
or herself as a gay man or lesbian. See Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1, 10-11 (D.D.C. 1991).
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
"'See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
.0 See, eg., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Steffan v. Cheney,
780 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991). Although the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a heightened level of
scrutiny for the mentally retrded in Cleburne, some commentators have argued that the rational basis
test applied in that case "departs from the traditional use of the rational bass test" and was, in fact,
"rational basis with a bite." See Nancy . Reminger, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center:
Rational Bass With a Bite?, 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 927, 945 (1986).
842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
003 Ky. CONsr. §§ 2, 3.
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These sections are augmented by sections 59 and 60 of the state
constitution, which prohibit the state legislature from passing "local or
special" legislation."°'
Kentucky's history demonstrates a commtment to equal treatment
under the law. The constitution forbids "whatever is essentially unjust
and unequal or exceeds the reasonable and legitimate interests of the
people 11105 In 1938, the state's lhghest court relied upon both the
state constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution in a case involving the unequal application of truck licensing
fees " The court stated that the purpose of these constitutional protec-
tions was "to place all persons similarly situated upon a plane of equality
under the law, and to fix it so that it would be impossible for any class
to obtain preferred treatment ,,107 Although classifications based on
"reasonable and natural distinctions" are not prohibited, they must not be
"manifestly so arbitrary and unreasonable as to impose a burden upon, or
exclude one or more of a class without reasonable basis in fact."'' 8
An argument advanced",m the Wasson bnefs"° but ignored by the
Kentucky Supreme Court concerned the standard for gender discrmina-
tion under the state constitution's equal protection clause."' In Com-
monwealth v. Burke,"' the court struck down statutes that prohibited
women who were not tavern licensees from serving as bartenders and
prohibited women from consuming alcoholic beverages at a bar."2 In
doing so, the court relied upon both federal and state grounds, but
Imposed a strict standard of scrutiny upon the state grounds."' The
court noted that "the state does not attempt to demonstrate any compel-
ling interest to be served [by the gender discrimination]. Therefore, m
these aspects the statutes are arbitrary and violate Section 2 of the
Constitution."" 4
Even when applying the lowest level of scrutiny, rational basis, state
courts have provided their own interpretations of the equal protection
standard. In 1986, the Kentucky Supreme Court struck down a statute
creating a so-called special statute of limitations for the construction
industry."5 The court relied on sections 2 and 3 of the state constitu-
1- Id. §§ 59, 60.
... Sanitation Dist. No. I v. City of LoInsville, 213 S.W.2d 995, 1000 (Ky. 1948).
'" Fischer v. Gneb, 113 S.W.2d 1139 (Ky. 1938).
... Id. at 1140.
I4 -d.
"* Brief for Appellee at 21-23, Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
, Ky. CoNsr. § 3.
481 S.W.2d 52 (Ky. 1972).
112 Id. at 54.
Id., see supra note 103 and accompanying text.
4 Burke, 481S.W.2d at 54.
2' Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179, 188 (Ky. 1986).
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tion, along with section 59, wich forbids local or special legislation. In
his 1986 opinion, Judge Leibson, author of the Wasson opinon, wrote:
"[T]he Kentucky Constitution is much more detailed and specific
than the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution."" 6 He
examined the record of debates surrounding the Kentucky Constitutional
Convention to demonstrate the drafters' aversion to legislation favoring
or discrimnatmg against one group over another."7 In a later case
involving a similar statute, the court noted:
Many [states] have general protection against "arbitrary power" as we
have in Kentucky Constitution § 2, and guarantees of "equal" rights and
protection against "grant" of "separate privileges" as we have in
Kentucky Constitution § 3. But few have additional protection against
local and special legislation as we have m Kentucky Constitution § 59.
So far as we can deternmne, none has anything like the combination of
broad constitutional protection of individual rights against legislative
interference vouchsafed by our 1891 Kentucky Constitution."'
Although, like most states,1' 9 Kentucky has not developed equal
protection jurisprudence to the same extent as privacy jurisprudence,
on those occasions when it has considered the issue, its interpretation
has been expansive.
Drawing upon this limited development of state equal protection
doctrine, Wasson's attorneys' argued that a classification based on
sexual orientation is inherently suspect and deserves strict scrutiny
They relied heavily on the reasoning and analysis of the concurring
opinion in Watkins v. United States Army,' in which Judge Norris
rejected the estoppel theory on which the majority opinion relied and
argued instead that the Army denied Watkins equal protection of the
law "2 Combining the uncontroverted evidence at Wasson's trial
with the arguments in Watkins, Wasson argued that the more
expansive state interpretation of equal protection mandated a finding
that the sodomy law is unconstitutional."
"I Id. at 183.
117 Id.
" Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809, 818 (Ky. 1991). Sections 59 and 60 of
the state constitution were not raised in Wasson's appellate bnef.
See Moms, supra note 20, at 621.
The three attorneys of record for defendant Wasson's brief before the Kentucky Supreme Court
were Ernesto Scorsone, Pam Goldman, and Dean W. Bucalos.
"' Brief for Appellee at 24-25, Commonwealih v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (citing
Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989)). For a discusson of the Watkins case,
see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
Watkins, 875 F.2d at 711 (Noms, J., concurring).
Brief for Appellee at 26, Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487.
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At Wasson's hearing, the defense had offered evidence that gays
qualify as a "suspect" class: they have suffered a history of purposeful
discrimiation, the discrimination has been invidious because one's sexual
orientation is immutable, and gays lack political power to seek re-
dress." A social historian offered extensive evidence that gay persons
have suffered a history of purposeful discrimination."z Sex experts
testified that changing one's sexual orientation can be just as difficult as
changing one's race or gender and is therefore just as immutable. 6
This is not to say that these traits can never be changed. For example,
one can have a sex change operation or change one's racial appearance
with pigment injections.'27
At a minimum, then, the Supreme Court is willing to treat a trait as
effectively immutable if changing it would involve great difficulty, such
as requiring a major physical change or a traumatic change of identi-
ty. "[I]mmutability" may describe those traits that are so central to
a person's identity that it would be abhorrent for government to penalize
a person for refusing to change them, regardless of how easy that
change might be physically.'s
The final factor that defines a class as "suspect" involves a finding
that the class members lack sufficient political power to obtain a remedy
from the political branches of government. This factor has proven to be
a stumbling block in other cases involving gays. For example, m Steffan
v. Cheney,'" the district court stated:
[IUt is still very clear that homosexuals as a class enjoy a good deal of
political power in our society. It is beyond doubt that the homo-
sexual community has been able to reach out and gain the attention of
politicians of all sorts. One need only remember St. Patrick's Day 1991
in New York City to see Mayor David Dinkns marching in the
traditionally Irish-Catholic parade with homosexual groups and activists
who were important supporters during his tough mayoral campaign."3
The court also noted the significant attention the gay community has
received lately in response to the AIDS epidemic and the fact that a few
members of Congress are openly gay. 3' But if one argues that equal
See Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 489-90.
"3 See Brief for Appellee at 24, Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487.
"3 See Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 489.
2 See Watldns, 875 F.2d at 726.
" Id.
780 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1991).
,3 Id. at 7-8 (footnotes omitted).
... Id. at 8-9.
W,'Uo,
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
protection under the state constitution is the applicable law, then it makes
sense to look at the political power gays have within their state borders. Their
power may be greater in some states than m others. If gay persons have
sufficient political power to obtain political redress, why do sodomy laws that
penalize their sexual conduct retain their viability in some states?" As
Judge Norris stated in Watlans: "It cannot be seriously disputed . that
homosexuals as a group cannot protect their right to be free from invidious
discrimination by appealing to the political branches"'
In addition to arguing that the law's classification demands strict scrutiny,
Wasson asserted that the law was not narrowly tailored to achieve its own
announced purposes. Based on state equal protection jurisprudence, the
applicable standard in Kentucky differs from the federal standard:
The United States Supreme Court evaluates the constitutionality ofeconomic
and social welfare legislation by determinng if the legislature had a
permissible purpose in mind when it adopted the law and if the classification
used was reasonably related to the accomplishment of its purpose. The
Kentucky courts evaluate the constitutionality of economic and social
welfare legislation under the state's constitutional guarantees of equality by
closely scrutinizng the importance of the purpose and the "fit" between the
classes created and the accomplishment of that purpose.'34
Although the purported purposes of the law were not raised at trial, on
appeal the Commonwealth alleged that these purposes were to "enhance
morality," to deter gays from engaging in sodomy, and to inhibit the spread
of AIDS.'35 Concerning the morality issue, the defendant noted that a recent
poll of Kentuckians found that 62.2% did not believe the state should regulate
in-home sexual activity of adults of the same gender."3 Furthermore, in
Kentucky, the police power allows onlypublic morality to be enforced by the
criminal law in order to prevent harm to others. The sodomy law governs
private acts.' 37
13 In fact, the Wasson case demonstrates the powerlessness of gay persons in a state like
Kentucky. The law penalizes only homosexual sodomy, see supra note 44, it was vigorously enforced
by law enforcement agencies, see supra note 1 and accompanying text, and when the news media
reported Wasson's challenge to the law, Wasson was fired from his job. Brief for Appellee at 25,
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d at 727 (Noms, 1, concurring).
Brief for Appellee at 27, Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (emphass in original) (citing Sanitation
Dist. No. I v. City of Lomsville, 213 S.W.2d 995 (Ky. 1948); City ofJackson v. Murray-Reed-Slone
& Co., 178 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1944); City of Lonsville v. Kuhn, 145 S.W.2d 851 (Ky. 1940)).
3 Id. at 29.
Id. at 16 (citing UK Poll Finds Most Kentuwkans Want Government Out of the Bedroom,
LEXINGrON HERALD-LEADER, July 19, 1991, at Ai).
"7 Id. at 10-12. The court accepted this argument in its opinion: "The clear implication is that
immorality in private which does 'not operate to the detriment of others,' is placed beyond the reach
of state action " Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 496 (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 173 S.W. 340,
[Vol 81
As for the deterrent effects of the law, uncontroverted testimony at
trial from a psychologist and a therapist demonstrated that sexual
orientation is not a matter of choice. They testified that making the sexual
acts of gay persons criminal would result in significant harm to them and
perhaps to others."3
Finally, concerning the AIDS argument, no evidence was presented
at trial that the statute prevented the spread of this disease. In fact, a
number of witnesses, including the state's chief of contagious diseases,
testified that the statute had the opposite effect by discouraging gays from
presenting an accurate medical history.' Additional AIDS education
was provided by several of the defendant's experts to demonstrate that
even if this justification for the statute were accepted, the statute is not
tailored narrowly to accomplish such a purpose." For example, the
statute penalizes sexual activity of lesbians, who are in one of the least
likely groups to contract AIDS,4 but does not penalize anal sex
between heterosexuals, which poses a much greater risk. The defendant's
experts stated that the most effective method for slowing the spread of
AIDS was education and counseling, yet the statute posed a significant
obstacle to those who nught be assisted by these means. Rather than
improve the public health, the statute actually accomplished the opposite.
This testimony, combined with the jurisprudence developed under the
state constitution's equal protection clause, served as the basis for the
Kentucky Supreme Court's equal protection holding.
D. The Opinion of the Kentucky Supreme Court
The Kentucky Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Commonwealth
v. Wasson on September 24, 1992, striking down the state's sodomy
statute as unconstitutional.'" The 4-3 decision was accompanied by two
stinging dissenting opinions. In order to head off any further appeals in
this seven-year-old case, the court made it clear that its decision rested
solely on state constitutional grounds. It added: "We discuss Bowers in
particular, and federal cases in general, not in the process of construing
343 (1915)).
SBrief for Appellee at 29-30, Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 30-31.
14 Id. at 31. Of all the adult cases of AIDS in the United States through April 1991, 59%
involved homosexual or bisemal men who did not use intravenous drugs, 22% involved females and
heterosexual males who used intravenous drugs, 7% involved homosexual or bisxual males who also
used intravenous drugs, and 3% involved persons who contracted AIDS through the recept of blood
products. AiDs AND THE LAw 5 (Wiley Law Publications Editorial Staff ed., 2d ed. 1992).
SBrief for Appellee at 30.
', See Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 499.
Id. at 502.
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the United States Constitution or federal law, but only where their
reasoning is relevant to discussing questions of state law."' 45
Before the court discussed the two state constitutional grounds upon
which it based its decision, it corrected a misconception that had
permeated the Commonwealth's argument: that sodomy as defined in the
Kentucky statute had been a crime when the state constitution was
adopted. The court pointed out that sodomy as defined at common law
penalized only anal intercourse between men and did not penalize many
of the acts prohibited m the current statute, such as oral intercourse or
sexual acts between women.1" The court stated that "the statute m
question here punishes conduct which has been historically and tradition-
ally viewed as nmoral, but much of which has never been punished as
criminal. ,,47
The court also addressed the effect of Bowers v. Hardwick on the
equal protection argument m this case. It has been noted above that
several circuit courts of appeal have relied on Hardwick to rebuff federal
equal protection arguments.'" The Kentucky court rejected that
approach, basing its stance on the fact that the statute at issue in Bowers
v. Hardwick penalized both heterosexual and homosexual conduct, while
the Kentucky statute penalized only homosexual conduct.' 4  Having
thus cleared the way for consideration of the merits of the case, the court
addressed the state right of privacy.
1. Pnvacy
The court justified its departure from Hardwick by relying upon
difference: difference m the texts of the federal and state constitution;
difference m the traditions of the federal and state governments,
particularly as to constitutional intent and common law; and difference m
the application of federal and state law in other areas.
a. Textual Differences
The court first noted that the state constitution was not drafted as an
imitation of the U.S. Constitution. In fact, some state constitutions had
been developed before 1791, when the U.S. Constitution was adopted.
"State constitutional law documents and the writings on liberty were more
1,5 Id. at 489.
"Id. at 491 (citing Commonwealth v. Poindexter, 118 S.W. 943 (Ky. 1909); United States v.
Milby, 400 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1968) (applying the holding m Pomdejxer)).
141 Id. at 491.
,"See supm notes 88-101 and accompanying text.
" Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 491.
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the source of federal law than the child of federal law."" Kentucky's
original Bill of Rights appears to have been fashioned after the constitu-
tion of Pennsylvania, which was adopted two years before Kentucky's Bill
of Rights.'M In fact, the '"original Kentucky Bill of Rights was bor-
rowed almost verbatim from the Pennsylvania Constitution of 179 0."'' M
A comparison of the language of the U.S. Constitution with that of
the state constitution demonstrates the differences. The federal right of
privacy arises, if at all, from "so-called 'emanations' and 'penumbras' of
the First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments using the Due Process
Clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, to create a so-called
zone of privacy .. ."" In addition to this language, the court noted
that the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution includes the "only reference to
individual liberties in the Federal Constitution! the Preamble provides
that the Constitution is established to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity.""M
On the other hand, the Kentucky Constitution, m addition to
"invoking the continuance of [God's] blessmgs" m its own Preamble,"s
includes a Bill of Rights that provides:
All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent
and inalienable rights, among whch may be reckoned:
First: The right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties.
Third: The right of seeking and pursuing their safety and happiness.
Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and
property of freemen exists nowhere m a republic, not even in the largest
majority.'1
b. Diffenng Traditions
The court compared the federal and state privacy guarantees by
examining documents surrounding the creation of the state constitution
and comparing the federal and state common law interpretations of the
right of privacy. The court concluded: "[W]hile we respect the decisions
of the United States Supreme Court on protection of individual liberty,
and on occasion we have deferred to its reasoning, certainly we are not
Im Id. at 492.
" Id.
"sId. (quoting Ken Gormley & Rhonda G. Hartman, The Kentucky Bill of Rights: A Bientenmul
Celebration, 80 KY. LJ. 1 (1991-92)).
... Id. at 493.
Id. (quoting U.S. CoNsr. pmbl.).
"s KY. CONsr. pmbl.
L4 Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 494 (quoting Ky. CoNsr. §§ 1, 2).
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bound to do so, and we should not do so when valid reasons lead to a
different conclusion.""'
In addition to noting that the Kentucky Bill of Rights'" resembles
the Pennsylvania Constitution more closely than it does the U.S.
Constitution, the court referred to the debates surrounding the Kentucky
Constitutional Convention of 189059 and cases decided during that
historic period that reflected an early interest in privacy rights.'" In
particular, the debates, although not using the "right of privacy"
terminology developed later, focused on the individual rights held by
citizens, including those m a minority, so long as their conduct did not
harm anyone else."' Although the constitution's drafters might not have
had protection of sodomous acts in mind, the court found that such
conduct should be given the same protection as the acts that the drafters
might have considered.62 The court boldly stated that the Supreme
Court's Hardwick decision was a "misdirected application of the theory
of original intent."" 3 To illustrate, the court noted that although the
founding fathers did not have in mind the protection of persons who
engage m interracial sex, the U.S. Supreme Court nevertheless recognized
in Loving v. Virginia that "a contemporary, enlightened interpretation of
the liberty interest involved m the sexual act made its punishment
constitutionally unpermissible."'" In the same way, a grudging insis-
tence on following the drafters' "original intent" m this case would be
misdirected.
The court then moved to the early twentieth century liquor cases to
demonstrate the long tradition of privacy rights in Kentucky. It relied
primarily on Commonwealth v. Campbell," which it quoted extensively as
"overwhelming affination!' that "[t]he right of privacy has been recognized
as an integral part of the guarantee of liberty m our Constitution since its
inception."'" The cases clearly implied "that immorality in private which
does 'not operate to the detriment of others' is placed beyond the reach of
1, Id. at 492.
KY. CoNsr. §§ 1-26.
I OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBTES IN THE 1890 CoNv, oN (E. Polk
Johnson ed., n.d.) [heriafter DEBATES].
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 494-97.
Id. at 494 (citing I DEBATES, supra note 159, at 614-18 (remarks of Delegate J.A. Brents of
Clinton County), 718 (remarks of 3. Proctor Knott of Marion County)).
162 Id.
,. Id. at 497.
'" Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)). See also Andrew Koppelman, Note, The
Mistegenadon Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimmaion, 98 YALE LJ. 145, 147 (1988)
(concluding that "sodomy and miscegenation statutes violate the equal protection clause for the same
reason: Beyond the immediate harm they inflict upon their victims, their purpose is to supapit a
regime of caste that locks some people into inferior social positions at buth.").
117 S.W. 383 (Ky. 1909).
" asson, 842 S.W.2d at 495.
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state action by the guarantees of liberty in the Kentucky Constitution.'
The court recognized the Millsian underpinnings of prior state constitutional
interpretation, drawing from Mill's philosophy several principles: 1) that
"criminal sanctions should not be used as a means to improve the
citizen"; 2) that "[tlhe majority has no moral right to dictate how everyone
else should live"; and 3) that "[p]ublic indignation, while given due weight,
should be subject to the overriding test of rational and critical analysis,
drawing the line at harmful consequences to others.!"s The court noted that
"enlightened paternalism" has added a restriction to Mill's philosophy,
allowing for intervention "to stop self-inflicted harm such as the result of
drug taking, or failure to use seat belts or crash helmets" only because the
victim burdens society, not because majority morality so dictates.'69
c. Application of State Constitutional Law in Other Areas
The court next demonstrated its willingness to depart from federal
constitutional interpretation by citing recent opinions m which Kentucky's
state constitutional jurisprudence differed from that of federal courts under the
U.S. Constitution."' Those examples involved the protection against double
jeopardy,' the right of confrontation," and two public school
cases.
73
The court pointed to four other states which, like Kentucky, have relied
on their own constitutions to strike down state sodomy statutes.' 7 These
cases demonstrated that Kentucky was not engaging m "leading edge" law,
but was simply "part of the moving stream.'" The court pointed out that
', Id. at 496 (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 173 S.W. 340, 343 (Ky. 1915)).
", Id. at 496.
, Id. at 496-97.
" Id. at 497.
" Id. (citing Ingram v. Commonwealth, 801 S.W.2d 321 (Ky. 1990)).
Id. (citing Dean v. Commonwealth, 777 S.W.2d 900 (Ky. 1989)).
" Id. The two school cases are Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky.
1989), and Fannin v. Williams, 655 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1983). Rose held that children from poorer
school districts had a fundamental right to an education comparable to those in wealthier districts,
790 S.W.2d at 189, although the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled in 1973 that there is no such
constitutional right. See San Antomo Indep. School Dist. v. Rdriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Famm
held that a statute that allowed a public librarian to supply books to children in private schools was
unconstitutional, 655 S.W.2d at 484, although the Supreme Court had held that such a law was
constitutional in Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
" These states are New York, People v. Onofiv, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980) (striking down
sodomy statute as violating rights of privacy and equal protection); Pennsylvama, Commonwealth
v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980) (holding sodomy statute unconstitutional under equal protection
clauses of both state and federal constitutions); Michigan, Michigan Org. for Human Rights v. Kelly,
No. 88-815820 (CZ) (Wayne Co. Cir. Ct., July 9, 1990) (same); and Texas, State v. Morales, 826
S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (finding Texas constitutional protections broader than those of U.S.
Constitution).
"' Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 498.
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Pennsylvania, whose constitution served as the basis for Kentucky's Bill of
Rights, had declared its sodomy law unconstitutional, relying on the same
Millsian underpinnings used by the Kentucky court m Commonwealth v.
Campbell.17 6
2. Equal Protection
The Kentucky Supreme Court immediately dispensed with the argument
that Bowers v. Hardwick in any way concerned equal protection by noting
that unlike the Kentucky sodomy statute, the Georgia statute penalized both
heterosexual and homosexual acts, and thus "the Equal Protection Clause was
not implicated."1" The court also rejected the argument that traditional
majority morality played a role in equal protection analysis: 'The Equal
Protection Clause protects minorities from discriminatory treatment at the
hands of the majority. Its purpose is not to protect traditional values and
practices, but to call into question such values and practices when they
operate to burden disadvantaged minorities ,,,178 If "traditional
morality" were the determinant of criminality, the court stated, all nonmarital
sex would be criminal, because it has traditionally been viewed as immoral:
"The issue here is not whether sexual activity traditionally viewed as immoral
can be punished by society, but whether it can be punished solely on the basis
of sexual preference."'79
The court did not fashion its analysis into a federal equal protection mold,
nor did it employ federal designations for the various classifications. Rather,
it looked to the state constitution for the proposition that "no class of persons
can be discriminated against under the Kentucky Constitution. All are entitled
to equal treatment, unless there is a substantial governmental interest, a
rational basis, for different treatment.""1sa
The court clearly believed that gay persons are entitled to the heightened
scmtmy standard and unplied that they constitute a suspect class,
although that terminology never received explicit articulation. The court noted
that the testimony at trial, along with briefs filed by anuci curiae,'
" Id. at 498. In fact, as the court noted, the Pennsylvania court utilized the same Mill quotations
in striling down its sodomy law as did the court in Campbell.
" Id. The court ignored other cases that had held that Hardwwk precludes a federal equal
protection analysis. See e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563
(9th Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989); Woodward v. United States,
871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
" Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 499 (quoting Watlans v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 718 (9th
Cir. 1989) (Noms, J., concurring)).
17 Id.
'" Id. at 500 (emphasis added). Obviously, "rational basis" has one meaning in federal equal
protection analysis and another in state analysis. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
.. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
" Among the briefs filed on behalf of Jeffrey Wasson were those of: 1) the Presbyterian Church
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demonstrated that although the sodomy law punishes onlythe specified sexual
acts, its effect is to punish the sexual orientation of certain citizens. These
citizens, therefore, constitute "a separate and identifiable class" entitled to
equal treatment, unless the government can produce a substantial interest
protected by the classification.'83
The interests asserted by the government, however, failed to
satisfy the court; many of them were found to be "simply outra-
geous. ' lu The only one that merited the court's attention was the
assertion that anal intercourse facilitates the spread of AIDS."
However, the statute is not tailored to address this concern; it is, in
fact, underinclusive because it does not penalize anal intercourse
among any group other than gay persons, even though a growing
number of heterosexual women contract AIDS from a male part-
ner.'" Although the court does not address the overinclusiveness of
the statute, that argument was also made during the trial. Lesbians are
less likely to contract AIDS from sexual acts than are hetero-
sexuals, 187 yet the statute penalizes lesbian and not heterosexual
conduct. "In the final analysis," the court stated, "we can attribute no
legislative purpose to this statute except to single out homosexuals for
different treatment" even though heterosexuals engage in the same
conduct." Kentucky's constitution does not allow for such differen-
tiation.
E. Concurrence and Dissents: A Philosophical Divide
The concurring opinion'"c by Justice Combs cited no cases,
constitutional provision, or any other source. Rather, its philosophical
exegesis lays bare the great divide between the competing views of
(U.S.A.) and the United Methodist Church; 2) the American Public Health Association; Community
Health Trust, Inc.; Heart to Heart, Inc., St. Jude Guild, Inc.; and AIDS Education Coalition, Inc.; 3)
American Friends Service Committee; American Jewish Comiittee; Central Presbyterian Church of
Lousville; Lexington Friends Meeting, Religious Society of Friends (Quakers); Office of Church in
Society of the United Church of Christ; Telos, Loisville; The Temple (Congregation Adath Israel
Brith Sholom), Lousville; Union of American Hebrew Congregations; Unitarian Universalist
Association; Unitarian Universalist Church of Lexington; Central Kentucky Council for Peace and
Justice; Fellowsup of Reconciliation, Central Kentucky and Louisville Chapters; 4) American
Psychological Association; Kentucky Psychological Association; Kentucky Psychiatric Association;
Kentucky Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers; Kentucky Society for Clinical
Social Workers; and 5) Kentucky Association of Cnnrinal Defense Lawyer Wasson, 842 S.W.2d
at 490 n.I.
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 500.
'u Id. at 501.
"' Id.; see AIDS AND THE LAw, supra note 141, at 4.
'u See AiDs AND THE LAw, supra note 141, at 5.
"Id. at 6.
"' Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 501.
Id. at 502 (Combs, J., concurring). Cluef Justice Stephens joined the concurring opinon.
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the majority and dissenting justices. Justice Combs had no reservations
about the majority opinion: "By writing separately, I intend to detract
nothing from this historic monument to freedom, liberty, and equality-the
birthright of every citizen of Kentucky. In form and substance, the
majority opinion is of a stature entirely commensurate with its noble pur-
pose. ' 1
90
Justice Combs wrote separately only to articulate his view of
constitutional law, one with which the majority presumably would agree:
a constitution does not create rights for citizens; it "merely recognizes
their primordial rights, and constructs a government as a means of
protecting and preserving them."' The role of a government created
by constitution is to "protect individual liberties, not to take them
away."'" He asserted that one's morality is a private matter, not to be
governed by the constitution nor the majority of citizens. The govern-
ment's "authority to interfere with one's liberty derives solely from its
duty to preserve the liberty of another."'93 Furthermore, the fact that the
right of privacy is not specifically mentioned does not matter, if one
accepts Justice Combs' philosophy. As he pointed out, the constitution
does not specifically provide that one has the right to "play checkers, to
smile or frown, to rise or rest, to eat or fast, to look at a king," yet no
one doubts that such rights exist. If one assumes that individual citizens
have the right to act in any way they desire, so long as another is not
harmed, then "the appropriate question is not 'Whence comes the right to
privacy?' but rather, 'Whence comes the right to deny it?""' Justice
Combs, in his brief concurring opinion, set forth the Millsian philosophy
that served as the foundation for interpreting the state constitution in prior
cases and for the opinion m Commonwealth v. Wasson.'95
The two dissenting opinions represent an entirely different political
philosophy, one that asserts that laws are properly based on the morality
of the majority. It is of no consequence, in this view, that one's evil acts
'g Id.
,, Id.
192 Id.
19 Id.
"I Id. at 503.
.., It also represents the approach to constitutional law articulated by the dissent in Bowers v.
Hardwic See Goldstein, supra note 14, at 1093-98. Professor Goldstein asserts that the opinions in
Hardwik reflect the difference between the political philosophies of the majority and dissent. The
majority opinion embraces the philosophy of Lord Patrick Devlin, who believed that the majority
(through judges and the legislature) has a nght to determine the morality of citizens regardless of
whether anyone else is harmed by the conduct in question. The dissent embraces the philosophy of
Professor H.L.A. Hart, who believed that government could penalize private behavior only when
another would be harmed by it. Professor Goldstein draws her arguments from the famous Hart-
Devlin debates. See H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MoRALnrY (1963); Hart, Immoraity and
Treason, THu LmisNER, July 30, 1959, at 162, repnnted m THE LAW AS LrERATURE (L. Blom-
Cooper ed. 1961); LORD PATRICK DEVuN, THE ENFoRcEmENT OF MORALS vi-viii (1965).
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harm no one else. As one of the dissenting justices noted, "'[n]o man is
an island."' "'
The dissenting opinion written by Justice Lambert" accused the
court of making social policy. In attacking the privacy argument of the
majority, Justice Lambert relied on the reasoning of the majority in
Hardwick, particularly on the argument that sodomy has historically been
condemned. 9 He reiterated the well-worn "original intent" doctrine to
demonstrate that the state constitution's drafters did not intend to protect
homosexual sodomy.'
Justice Lambert also attacked the equal protection argument, primarily
by insisting that federal equal protection interpretation is the proper
standard for the state court to follow.2 °° He insisted that the sodomy
statute did not create a class of homosexual persons; rather, it penalized
sexual activity between persons of the same gender, whether they
identified themselves as "homosexual" or not."0 He thus differentiated
the sexual acts, which the statute penalized, from the status of being a
gay person, which the statute did not penalize.
His justification for employing the federal standard for equal
protection analysis involved reliance upon taxation cases that analyze
classifications under the state's equal protection clause. Here, Justice
Lambert performed a sleight of hand, an obfuscation of sorts. He
dismissed the state equal protection clause by asserting that "this Court
held in Delta Air Lines2" that the standards are the same under the
Kentucky Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution."2 "3 He then quoted from the same opinion: "'The
Legislature has a great freedom of classification and the presumption of
validity can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that it
is hostile and oppressive against particular persons and classes."' 2 4
What Justice Lambert did not explain was that Delta Air Lines was
a tax case that involved a legislative tax classification. The court also
stated in that case, immediately after the quoted language, that "[a] single
standard can be applied to both the State and Federal constitutions in
I-Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 512 (Wintersheuier, J., dissenting) (quoting JOHN DONNE, DEVOTIoNS
UPON EminGoEr OCCASIONS 107, 108 (Umv. Mich. 1965)).
", Id. at 503 (Lambert, 3., dissenting). Justice Reynolds joined m this dissent.
'"Id. at 503. In his dissent, Justice Lambert cites the Bible to demonstrate that sodomy was
severely pumshed m Biblical times. The book of Leviticus, cited by tis Justice, indeed imposes the
death penalty upon mon who engage m sexual itercourse together, but it also imposes the death
penalty upon those who commit adultery. Leviticus 20:10, 20:13 (New Am. Bible for Catholics).
I" Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 504, 507 (Lambert, J., dissenting).
Id. at 507-08.
N, Id. at 507.
, Delta Air Lines v. Commonwealth Revenue Cabiet 689 S.W.2d 14 (Ky. 1985).
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 508 (Lambert, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
"'Id. (quoting Delta Air Lies, 689 S.W.2d at 18).
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regard to classification for sales tax exemptions." o As for the legisla-
ture's "freedom of classification," the court m Delta Air Lines relied upon
a U.S. Supreme Court case that stated: "The broad discretion as to
classification possessed by a legislature in the field of taxation has long
been recognized."2' This large area of discretion "is needed by a
legislature m formulating sound tax policies" and "in taxation, even more
than other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom m classifica-
tion."2 7 Thus, Justice Lambert equated classifications based on tax
status, which deserve a presumption of validity, with classifications based
on sexual orientation, which by their very nature deserve no such
presumption, unless the legislature is presumed to have special expertise
and interest in that most mtimate of areas.
Once he determined that the proper standard to apply for equal
protection analysis is a federal standard, Justice Lambert had no difficulty
finding that the defendant's analysis must fail. He asserted that the
"[p]rotection of public 'health, safety and morality' is a legitimate state
interest."8  He then asserted that the AIDS epidemic "indisputably
originated in this country in the homosexual community" and that
Hardwick "forthrightly [held] that the rational basis standard was satisfied
by majority sentiments as to the immorality of homosexuality."
Justice Lambert thereby incorporated the federal interpretation of the Due
Process Clause into the state interpretation of its own equal protection
clause. By that analysis, the challenge to the Kentucky sodomy law must,
of course, fail.
Justice Wintersheimer's dissent was long, emotional, and virulent. Not
surprisingly, only one other justice associated himself with Winter-
sheimer's dissent and then by concurring only in the result.2t The
opinion includes the following incendiary language: The majority opinion
"totally misstates the case";' "in the rambling rhetoric of over 9,000
words, the majority opinion blithely tramples on the rights of the majority
of the public";2 '2 "'[e]manations and penumbras' are more suited to a
seance or a psychic experience rather than to a judicial opinion"' 3 the
philosophy of John Stuart Mill is "discredited and irresponsible";2 4
Delta Air Lines, 689 S.W.2d at 18 (emphasis added).
Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1940) (emphams added), cited w Delta Air Lies,
689 S.W.2d at 18.
Id. at 88.
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 508 (Lambert, 3., dissenting) (quoting Bosworth v. City of Leangton,
125 S.W.2d 995, 1000 (Ky. 1930)).
Id. at 509 (Lambert, ., dissenting).
"'Id. (Wintersheimer, ., dissenting). Justice Reynolds concurred in the result only.
211 Id.
2 Id. at 510.
113 Id. at 512.
" Id. at 519.
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"[tihe average person must wonder if the majority opinion means that
telemarketers can now invade Kentucky with legal telephone calls to
solicit consensual sodomy? What is to prevent it?""2 5 He ended his
dissent by suggesting a constitutional amendment to make sodomy a
crime as a matter of constitutional law
2 16
Justice Wintersheimer launched a buckshot attack on the majority
opinion, taking ain at nearly every aspect of every argument advanced
by the majority. He initially asserted that the court had no need to address
the issue of privacy because the act with which the defendant was
charged was solicitation to commit sodomy, a "public" act involving the
proposition of a stranger on a public street.2 7
The Justice then asserted that gay persons were not a protected class
under federal constitutional law,2 ' that the act punished conduct rather
than a class of people, 9 that gays were more promiscuous than
heterosexuals. 0 that anal sodomy (presumably engaged in by gays
only) spread AIDS, that no right of privacy can be found m the
original intent of the state constitution's drafters t and that the morality
of the majority can legally control the morality of the minority. m He
turned the privacy argument on its head by referring numerous times to
the privacy rights of citizens who might be accosted on the streets by gay
persons soliciting sex He stated that "anyone who approaches this
subject with an intelligent attitude of open-mindedness" would agree with
the views of the U.S. Supreme Court on the issue of privacytm then
noted: "Of course [sodomy] has been considered morally wrong since the
beginning of time, but this is a secular legal question here. The very word
'sodomy' is derived from the biblical name of the city of Sodom which
was destroyed by God for its perverse behavior.' 6
215 Id.
ltId.
21? Id. at 510. Justice Wintershein noted that the crime with which Wasson was charged was
solicitation, not sodomy itself, and that the solicitation took place on a public stree. As the district
court opinion succinctly notes, "fi]fthe statute outlawing the conduct he allegedly solicited is invalid,
then he cannot be convicted of an offense for soliciting that conduct." Commonwealth v. Wasson,
No. 86-M-859 (Fayette Dist. Ct. Oct. 3, 1986), slip op. at 1. The solicitation occurred on the
instigation of an undercover police officer who engaged the defendant in suggestive conversation for
nearly twenty-five mnutes before the defendant finally conuritted the act necessary to charge
him-inviting the police officer to his home to engage in sexual activity.
211 Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 511.
lit Id.
m d.
221 rd.
= Id.
m d.
Id. at 518-19; see supra note 217.
"' Id. at 510.
:" Id. at 511; see supra note 48 and accompanying text. Lot's counteroffer to the townsmen to
rape his virgin daughters is apparently not as disturbing as the possibility of homosexual sex; at least,
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In any event, Justice Wintershetmer vehemently disagreed with the
majority opimon and believed that the judiciary had overstepped its
bounds and violated the separation of powers doctrine: "Any change m
the Kentucky sodomy statute must be made [by] the legislature ,,,-7
a change he clearly would not welcome. This became clear when, at the
end of his opinion, he implicitly invited a move to amend the state
constitution to crimmalize sodomy as a matter of constitutional law.s
III. AND BEYOND
Although Justice Wintershetmer's suggestion for a constitutional
amendment may appear extreme, two states have already considered
similar proposals. In November 1992, Oregon and Colorado voters cast
ballots to amend their constitutions either to prevent legislation protective
of gay rights or to classify homosexuality as "abnormal, wrong, unnatural
or perverse." Thus it appears that gays will be engaged m an uphill
battle m the future to preserve their hard-fought gains, and state
constitutional law may be the only way to do so.
Even if the sodomy laws are not currently being enforced m some
states, "unenforced sodomy laws are the chief systematic way that society
as a whole tells gays they are scum." Furthermore, the fact that
homosexual sex is outlawed serves as a sword of Damocles over the
heads of gay men and lesbians, constantly reminding them that it could
fall without notice. Additionally, "[b]y branding all gays as criminals, the
sodomy prohibition provides ajustification for other forms of discnmma-
tion . m such areas as employment, professional licensing, free speech,
immigration, adoption, and child custody."'
Sodomy laws have been undergoing transition for the past thirty
years, first legislatively and more recently, judicially. From 1961, when
Illinois decriminalized sodomy, until the 1980s, the trend moved toward
that part of the story seems not to have receved as much attention.
I" Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 515.
2n Id. at 519.
T inmothy Egan, Anti-Gay Backdashes Are on 3 States'Ballots, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1992, at E4.
Oregon's rejected amendment, Ballot Measure 9, would not only have classified homosexuality as
wrong or perverse, but would also have made it "the government's job to actively discourage
homosexuality at all levels of state authority." Id. In Portland, Mmne, voters also defeated an
initiative that would have repealed a recently enacted ordinance that prohibited discrumunation based
on sexual preference. See Andrew Bluin, Junsts, Initiativs on Ballot, NAT'L LAW J., Nov. 16, 1992,
at 1, 31. However, Colorado voters approved a proposal that "blocked the state or any political entity
from adopting or enforcing gay nghts protections, thereby rescinding laws m Denver and Aspen."
Id.
" Richard D. Mohr, Mr Justice Douglas at Sodom: Gays and Privacy, 18 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 43, 53 (1986-87).
n' Koppelman, supra note 164, at 145.
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legislative repeal of sodomy statutes.' At the same time, some states
narrowed the reach of their sodomy statutes, limiting them to homosexual
acts. "Since 1973, eight states have amended their laws to specify that
oral or anal sex is prohibited only between persons of the same sex."
In 1993, twenty-four states and the District of Columbia still crinunalize
sodomy between consenting adults.'
In the past fifteen years, the movement toward legislative repeal or
modification appears to have stopped, and the battle has instead moved
into the courts. 5 Bowers v. Hardwick did much to stem that tide, at
least in terms of attacking sodomy statutes on federal constitutional
grounds. And, perhaps as a side effect of that case, efforts such as those
m Oregon and Colorado are under way to turn back decisions that some
have perceived as granting gays too much protection. The most vocal
advocates of these efforts no doubt embrace the political philosophy that
allows the morality of the majority to govern the morality of the minority.
As a result, it does not seem likely that state legislatures will serve as
champions of gay rights. State constitutional law may represent the only
means by which gays may seek redress, either through the use of state
privacy doctrine or through equal protection analysis.'
- See Nan D. Hunter, Lif After Hardwick, 27 HASiv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 531, 538 (1992); Juli
A. Moms, supra note 20, at 610. Wisconsin, the last state to repeal a sodomy law, did so m 1983.
Hunter, supra, at 538.
2m Hunter, supra note 232, at 538. Those states are Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, Tennessee, and Texas. Id. at 538 n.30. But courts m two of those eight states,
Kentucky and Texas, have now declared the statutes unconstitutional. See Commonwealth v. Wasson,
842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992). The Texas
decision was based solely on the state right of privacy. Oklahoma has interpreted its gender-neutral
sodomy law to be unconstitutional as it relates to heterosexuals, but it has refused to interpret the
statute as it relates to gays. See Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. 1986).
Im ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(aX3) (1982); ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1411, -1412 (1989); ARx.
CODE ANN. § 5-14-122(b) (Michie 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
800.02 (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (Michie 1992); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1987); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1988); LA. Ry. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986); MAss. ANN. LAws ch.
272 § 34 (Law. Co-op 1992); MD. CODE ANN., CgiM. LAw §§ 553-54 (1992); MicN. COMp. LAws
ANN. § 750.158, .338, .338(a)-(b) (West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (West 1987); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972); Mo. REv. STAT. § 566.090 (1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505
(1991); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 201.190 (1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1991); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West 1983); R.ILL GEN. LAws § 11-10-1 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120
(Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-510 (1991); Tnx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (West
1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (1990); VA. CODE ANN § 18.2-361 (Michie 1992).
' Se, eg., State v. Ciuffim, 395 A.2d 904 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1978) (instructing that consent is
available as defense); People v. Onofte, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980) (striking down sodomy statute);
Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980) (declanng sodomy statute unconstitutional).
Although only a handful of states (ARu. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122(aX2) (Michie 1987); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1988); Mo. REv. STAT. § 566.090 (1991); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505
(1991); NEv. REv. SrAT. § 201.190 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-510 (1991) and Oklahoma
by interpretation, Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. 1986)) limit their sodomy law to those of the
same gender, equal protection analysis may also apply if the gender-neutral sodomy law is
discrimnatorily enforced. See Bowers v. Hardwik 478 U.S. 186, 202 n.2 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,
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If the mood of the country is changing in the area of gay rights,
reflecting what some gay rights advocates call a "backlash! 27 or what
others might call a judicial change from classical liberalism to classical
conservatism, s then it becomes imperative to examine state constitu-
tional law to determine whether it can serve where federal constitutional
law or state and federal legislative action fail.
In other areas as well, state constitutional law may provide the only
available means to protect the rights of individuals. Those who tradition-
ally depended upon the U.S. Constitution for such protection-m the area
of abortion rights, the right to die, or in other areas where one's private
decision making should be protected from majority morality-would do
well to examine instead their own state's history of providing for the
autonomy of its citizens, both through its common law and through the
creation of its own constitution.
dissenting).
237 Egan, supra note 229.
2 See Goldstein, supra note 14, at 1099. Professor Goldstein discusses the differences between
these two political philosophies by companng the majority and dissenting opinions in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), with the famous Hart-Devlin debates. See supra note 195. In both
instances, she argues, the battle was 'between two incommensurable and incompatible systems of
fundamental values: classical liberalism and classical conservatisr." Goldstein, supra, at 1099. She
defines the values embodied in philosophies: "Individual freedom is of paramount value for classical
liberalism, and the continued existence of society in its present form is of paramount value for
classical conservatism." Id.
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